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Abstract: One of the main questions, when designing the principles of the rate of return regulatory 
method, is “what is a fair rate of return”. This question is important since a fair rate of 
return is essential for sustaining a fi nancial stability of regulated companies and securing 
prudential new network investments. This paper tackles a problem of setting a fair rate of 
return in case of Croatia for four monopoly network activities, transmission and distribu-
tion in electricity and gas sector. A method used for setting a rate of return as defi ned in the 
regulatory sub-laws is a weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The goal of this paper is 
twofold: i) to validate the methodology prescribed by the regulator having in mind that the 
national economic, fi nancial and regulatory environment has not yet reached its maturity, 
thus hindering consistent estimation of particular WACC parameters and ii) to analyze the 
results obtained for WACC.  The fi ndings of research indicate that signifi cant improve-
ments should be made concerning the overall regulatory policy and defi ned methodologi-
cal approach.
Keywords: monopoly, regulation, WACC 
JEL Classifi cation: G18 
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Introduction
The consequences of energy markets’ liberalization are the introduction of natural 
monopolies’ regulation and establishment of national regulatory authorities. Name-
ly, the process of liberalization in come countries had started before a regulatory 
authority was established. In addition, the fi rst Electricity (1996) and Gas (1998) 
Directive did not insist on establishing an independent and competent national regu-
latory authority (NRA). In the course of time, it became obvious that an independent 
NRA is essential for proper functioning of the market. The objective of regulation is 
to secure effi cient allocation of resources, improve effi ciency of regulated compa-
nies and protect customers’ interest in cases where competition is not possible or is 
not economically justifi ed. The regulation of monopoly activities in electricity and 
gas sector in Croatia was introduced in 2001, when the fi rst set of energy laws was 
passed, and furthermore in 2002, when the NRA was established. The NRA was in 
charge of regulating transmission and distribution activities in both sectors. Although 
the history of regulation started almost a decade ago, not much effort was put into 
development and implementation of the fully-fl edged regulatory policy and tools. 
This fact still leaves much space for empirical analysis and discussions in regard 
to particular regulatory components, which in most developed countries, especially 
in the EU, have been thoroughly analyzed and discussed from the very beginning 
of introduction of economic regulation methods. The extensive overview of these 
methods, their individual elements and discussions on pros and cons could be fi ned 
in (Banovac and Štritof, 2005; Gelo and Štritof, 2005; Štritof and Krajcar, 2008).   
In Croatia a chosen method of economic regulation of three monopoly activities, 
the electricity transmission, distribution and gas distribution, is the rate-of-return 
method (RoR). In the fourth activity, namely a gas transmission, a hybrid method 
was chosen. It comprises of elements of the RoR and the Revenue Cap method. 
Although the methods were chosen in 2006 they even at that time did not represent 
the state of the art in regulation of natural monopolies. However, Croatia is not an 
isolated case when it comes to choosing a regulatory method. Namely, in some other 
transition or ex-transition countries, where there is only one national company car-
rying out certain monopoly activity or the NRA is not competent and independent 
enough, the RoR or a combination of RoR and incentive method are chosen as well 
(e.g. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, Serbia) (ERRA, 
2009). 
From a point of view of regulatory principles’ evolution pattern, the RoR repre-
sents an initial phase in the evolution (Fig. 1), thus leaving much space for further 
improvements of the regulatory regime. However, a challenge of setting an initial 
fair ground of NRA’s practice causes potential regulatory risks. The risks could be 
reduced by carrying out substantial analysis and developing adequate regulatory 
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methods and tools, including data and information collection, processing and results’ 
analysis. Moreover, such exercises should overcome an information asymmetry be-
tween regulated companies and the NRA. 
Fig. 1: Phases in evolution of regulatory principles with a reference to incentives
 
Source: Vickers and Yarrow, 1998
When designing the RoR according to (Vickers and Yarrow, 1998) one of the 
main questions is “what is a fair rate of return”. This question is important since a 
fair rate of return is essential for sustaining a fi nancial stability of regulated compa-
nies and securing prudential new network investments. The authors considered solv-
ing this question in their research quite challenging especially in the environment 
of a country in transition with small electricity and gas markets and with an unde-
veloped understanding of regulatory processes, including a lack of well-grounded 
regulatory analysis. 
The challenge is additionally strengthened by the fact that the methodologies (in 
a form of a by-law) passed by the Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency (CERA) set 
rather theoretical principles, lacking clear and straightforward explanation in which 
way a certain parameter should be calculated or which data (e.g. in regards to as-
sets) will be accepted in a regulatory formula. Such approach leaves much space for 
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subjective interpretation and implementation by both parties - CERA and regulated 
undertaking. Additionally implementation of the methodologies, lacking transparent 
regulatory process, has not resulted in neither developing regulatory tools nor car-
rying analysis of the implications that the regulatory process per se has on parties 
involved. 
The paper focuses on a single element of the regulatory method, namely on the 
rate-of-return. The primary aim is to present and discuss experience of estimating 
a fair rate-of-return for all four analyzed activities as defi ned by the methodologies 
in the environment (economic, fi nancial and regulatory) which has not reached its 
maturity. The calculations and results presented in this paper are not an integral part 
of the regulatory processes already carried out in Croatia due to the fact that such 
detailed and substantiated estimates CERA has not performed so far. Therefore, the 
values for WACC and its components are neither known nor publically available. 
Such non-transparent regulatory behaviour is in contrast with the principles of good 
regulation demonstrated in (Green et.al., 2006).
Therefore, the estimates shown in the paper are the result of authors’ own re-
search. The fi ndings of research additionally indicate that it is essential to develop 
and apply a consistent, properly and clearly defi ned method for calculating a well-
grounded rate of return as an integral part of regulatory process. Thus, decreasing the 
ambiguities which could occur during the regulatory process, especially in circum-
stances in which a development of regulatory policy is in its initial phase.   
A structure of the paper is as follows. The second Section gives an overview and 
economic analysis of Croatian electricity and gas sectors, in particular of energy un-
dertakings analyzed in the paper. The third Section provides a legislative framework 
for regulation of monopoly activities. In the fourth Section the method used for cal-
culation of a rate-of-return is presented. The calculations and results are given in the 
Section fi ve, which is followed by the sixth Section in which thorough discussion is 
carried out and conclusions are drawn. 
Overview of Electricity and Gas Sector
The energy sector is very important for the economic development of Croatia, which 
additionally increases the importance of CERA’s role in monitoring and regulating 
the energy markets.
Although the sector employees roughly 2.3% of all employees in Croatia (MIN-
GORP, 2009), according to (MINGORP, 2009) the total income of the sector in 2008 
represents 22% in GDP. At the same time the consolidated result shows that a net 
profi t was less than 1% of total income (Table 1). One can notice a huge discrepancy 
between the total income and the resulting consolidated profi t. Such discrepancy is 
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not acceptable for a capital intensive sector in which large investments are expected. 
If these fi gures are compared to fi gures from telecom sector, where in total the lead-
ing operators (mobile and fi xed) realized the income of 8 billion kunas and 2 billion 
kunas net profi t, one comes to the conclusion that urgent measures and actions are 
needed to be taken in the energy sector making it more profi table. 
By a notion energy sector four sectors are encompassed: electricity, gas, district 
heating and oil. The electricity sector is dominated by one incumbent company - Hr-
vatska elektroprivreda (HEP Group). The owner of all assets in the Group is a mother 
stock company HEP. The primary business of HEP Group includes a whole chain 
of electricity activities (production, transmission, distribution, supply and trade). Its 
share in overall state production is 99% and it is the only company that carries out 
transmission and distribution activity. It is fully state owned and its daughter com-
panies are legally unbundled. The available generation capacity of HEP Group is 
roughly 4 GW. This capacity includes 17 hydro power plants (2.09 GW), 7 thermo 
power plants (1.56 GW) and 50% of the nuclear power plant Krško located in Slov-
enia (0.35 GW) (HEP, 2008). The operator of transmission network is HEP-Operator 
prijenosnog sustava ltd (HEP-OPS), while the operator of distribution network is 
HEP-Operator distribucijskog sustava ltd (HEP-ODS).
Table 1: Data on the state of the energy sector
Company
/sector
Income Net profi t Assets Network length Employees
billions kunas* km (000)
Energy sector (total) 74 664 -* - 34
HEP Group*** 9.85 308 33 - 14.5
HEP – OPS 1.0 61 4.5 7.000 1.2
HEP - ODS 3.5 118 15 100.000 9.6
Plinacro 0.56 115 2.7 2.110 0.55
GPZ 0.4 3.4 1.7 3.700 0.5
* 1 EUR=7.4 kunas
** N/A
*** Including electricity business only
Source: MINGORP, 2009; HEP, 2008; Plinacro, 2008; GPZ, 2008
The income of HEP Group in 2008 resulting from electricity business reached 
83% of total HEP Group income (all business activity included), while the net profi t 
was 308 million kunas (consolidated profi t of the Group was 31 million kunas). In 
the same year the sale of electricity reached 17.7 TWh and HEP’s production was 
14.3 TWh.
Regarding business operation of monopoly activities carried out by HEP-OPS 
and HEP-ODS and regulated by the CERA, it is worthwhile to mention that HEP-
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OPS’s total income in 2008 was about 10% of HEP Group income (only electricity 
business) while its net profi t was about 20% of HEP Group’s net profi t (Table 1). 
HEP-OPS operates transmission network (including 400kV, 220 kV and 100 kV as-
sets) (HEP, 2008). In the same year the operating income of HEP-ODS was about 
35% of HEP Group income and the net profi t was about 40% of HEP Group net 
profi t. HEP-ODS operates distribution network (HEP, 2008). A signifi cant share of 
distribution asset value results from customers’ participation through connection 
fees due to a deep connection fee approach. This fact had also an impact on authors’ 
analysis and calculations. 
A situation in the gas sector, compared to electricity sector, seems to be more 
complex, especially in regard to a number of companies and ownership structure, 
which enables a potential design of complex regulatory policy. Moreover, in this 
sector the ownership unbundling between market and regulated activities within the 
incumbent company INA-Industrija nafte was already carried out in 2002. Nowa-
days, INA is engaged in production and trade of gas and oil. Its ownership is mixed 
(44.84% state, 47.26% Hungarian company MOL and 7.90% private and institu-
tional investors). Since the fi rst phase of its privatization in 2006, INA was listed at 
the Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE) and till today it is the only company from the gas 
sector which has been quoted. The second company from the energy sector which is 
quoted at the ZSE is JANAF. JANAF carries out transport of oil and it is predomi-
nantly state owned.
Natural gas is produced in 17 inland gas fi elds and 6 sea fi elds. Domestic pro-
duction covers 61% of consumption needs in Croatia (in 2008 consumption was 3.2 
billion m3) (INA, 2008).
A gas transmission operator Plinacro ltd was separated from INA in 2002 and 
today is fully state owned. Plinacro owns and operates transmission network 
(Plinacro, 2008). The network length increases signifi cantly each year due to the 
accelerated gasifi cation of certain areas and the fulfi lment of the national develop-
ment and construction program whose planned investments are 500 million € by 
2011. Due to this program Plinacro’s net profi t was about 21% of total income in 
2008. Such signifi cant net profi t should also results from the CERA’s regulatory 
policy.
A gas distribution is carried out by 37 local distribution companies which oper-
ate 17.7 thousand kilometres of distribution network (GPZ, 2008). The ownership 
of the networks is various – private, state owned, municipality owned, mixed. A 
share of fi ve biggest distributers is 65%. The biggest distributor is Gradska plinara 
Zagreb (GPZ) which covers the area of the capital and several surrounding areas. 
Its owner is the city of Zagreb and its share in overall distributed quantities in 2008 
was roughly 33% (440 million out of 1.3 billion m3) (GPZ, 2008). A fact, worth-
while to mention and relevant for further calculations, is that GPZ has no debt in 
55A Comprehensive Approach to Regulation of Natural Monopolies – Setting a Fair Rate of Return
fi nancial statements, primarily due to historic local government’s policy. Namely, a 
construction of local distribution network was fi nanced solely from connection fees 
and profi t, no loans were taken. 
Regulation of Monopoly Activities
A general framework for development of regulatory policy and methods has been 
gradually established since 2001 when a set of fi rst energy laws was passed. This 
set of laws defi ned that the NRA was in charge of setting the electricity transmis-
sion and distribution tariffs as well as the gas transmission tariff, while the gas dis-
tribution tariffs were in competence of local authorities. At that time a regulatory 
method for setting electricity transmission and distribution tariffs was not defi ned 
(unknown), meaning that it was not recognizable which regulatory method was 
applied (e.g. rate-of-return, incentive regulation, etc.). Such undefi ned approach 
was not an isolated case, since in some other European countries (e.g. France, 
Italy, Germany), in the fi rst phases of market opening and developing of regulatory 
policies and methods, the applied regulatory methods were also undefi ned (Štritof 
and Krajcar, 2008). The only activity for which a regulatory method, at that time, 
was to a certain extent defi ned and applied from the very beginning of introducing 
regulation was gas transmission. The applied method was a combination of RoR 
and revenue cap method.
Further development of the legal framework and its harmonization with the 2003 
EU acquis (the Electricity and Gas Directive and regulations) resulted in passing the 
second set of energy laws in December 2004, which included: 
- Energy act,
- Electricity market act,
- Gas market act,
- Act on production, distribution and supply of thermal energy and
- Act on the regulation of energy activities.
To a certain respect, some of solutions envisaged with the new set of laws were 
a step backwards, especially in regard to activities of electricity transmission, dis-
tribution and gas transmission. New amendments of the Energy act defi ned that the 
CERA was in charge of setting methodologies for calculating network tariffs, both 
electricity and gas, while the Government was responsible for setting respective tar-
iffs calculated according to the methodology passed by the CERA. Thus the NRA 
lost the responsibility for setting tariffs (Fig. 2) (Banovac et al, 2007). 
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Fig. 2: Procedure for setting methodologies and tariffs
Source: Banovac et al, 2007
During year 2006 and 2007 the CERA passed four sub-laws, so called tariff sys-
tems, which defi ne a regulatory method for calculating tariffs for all four respective 
activities (CERA 2006; 2007; 2010):
1 Tariff system for electricity distribution, without the amounts of tariff items;
2 Tariff system for electricity transmission, without the amounts of tariff items;
3 Tariff system for natural gas distribution, without the amounts of tariff items;
4 Tariff system for natural gas transmission, without the amounts of tariff items.
In the fi rst three tariff systems a light-handed RoR method was chosen. Its main 
characteristic is that the allowed revenues are set by analyzing the costs of a particu-
lar regulated company and not by comparing these costs with the costs of similar 
regulated companies. The RoR standard formula used for calculating the allowed 







 is the allowed revenue in year t;
OPEX
t
 are operating costs in year t;
RAB
t
 is the average value of regulated asset base in year t;
R OPEX RAB WACC Dt t t t t= + ⋅ +
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WACC
t
 is the weighted average cost of capital in year t and
D
t
 is depreciation in year t.
The main drawbacks of this method are the lack of incentives for effi ciency im-
provements and potentially too excessive rewards which could result in over-capital-
ization. These drawbacks have been greatly discussed and criticized by many authors 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; Irastorza, 2003; Bernstein and Sappington, 1999). These 
discussions and analysis resulted in designing more complex and advanced regula-
tory methods whose aim was a reduction of monopoly ineffi ciencies. Moreover, due 
to the fact that cost reductions could jeopardise a level of quality of supply, further 
developments were directed toward ensuring suffi cient quality of supply (Štritof and 
Krajcar, 2008). However, the analysis and discussions in regard to the elements of 
more complex regulatory methods go beyond a scope of this paper. 
An element of RoR method which presents one of the origins when it comes to 
regulatory involvement is a rate of return. This element, additionally, requires not only 
familiarity with companies’ costs and business activities, but also understanding of a 
national and international socio-economic environment, consequently, making it more 
challenging for setting its justifi ed level. The tariff systems, except Tariff system for 
natural gas transmission, defi ne the WACC approach as a method for calculating a fair 
rate of return. A methodological basis for determination of WACC has been rooted in 
modern fi nance theory. As the theory evolved, the asset pricing models have been de-
veloped accordingly. The WACC approach is used by majority of NRAs when setting 
the rate of return (Karotamm, 2010; Frontier Economics, 2005).  
In the Croatian case, especially in respect to the allowed revenue setting, the 
CERA has not yet carried a thorough analysis of the WACC estimates, neither has 
analysed the implications of rate of return that was actually applied after the Gov-
ernment, as a fi nal instance, had set the level of network tariffs. This fact increased 
a regulatory risk for the companies, although the RoR is considered as a low regu-
latory risk method for them while most of the risk lies with consumers. Namely, 
companies in a regulatory process have incentive to fi le high level of costs primarily 
capital (CAPEX), accepted in a regulatory asset base on which a rate-of-return is ap-
plied. Such high level of costs leads toward over-capitalization, which results in high 
quality and prices above optimal (Ajodhia and Hakvoort, 2005). 
Additionally, such a non-transparent approach had an impact on the answer to 
the question “what is a fair rate of return in the Croatian case”, thus leaving it unan-
swered for all four monopoly activities.
Method Used for Calculating a Rate of Return
In this paper four activities are analyzed. For three activities, as mentioned above, a 
methodology for calculating WACC is defi ned. For the gas transmission a methodol-
58 Ivo Družić, Ivona Štritof, Tomislav Gelo
ogy for calculating WACC has not been defi ned, although the Tariff system per se 
stresses that the regulatory method is the revenue cap method. Moreover, a meth-
odological basis for calculating other regulatory parameters has not been set as well. 
Due to the fact that the WACC for gas transmission could not be estimated according 
to the methodology defi ned in the respective Tariff system, the calculation of this 
activity WACC for the purpose of this paper follows the calculation principles of 
other three activities. 




D is the total debt (kn);
E  is the total equity (kn);
r
d
 is the cost of debt (average interest rate on liabilities) (%);
r
e
 is the cost of equity (%) and
T is the corporate tax rate (%).
The cost of debt is defi ned as the average interest rate on liabilities. However, 
a very common regulatory approach in estimating the cost of debt is based on esti-
mating the risk free rate on which country specifi c debt premium is added (Frontier 
Economics, 2005). 
For calculating the cost of equity the most widely used regulatory approach is 
chosen, as elaborated in (Brounen et al, 2004). Namely, the cost of capital in tariff 
system is estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):












 is the risk free rate;
β is the measure of relative (or non-diversifi able) risk of the company or industry 
r
m





) is the market risk premium.
A parameter in the CAPM model which seemed to be the most requiring for esti-
mating is the Beta coeffi cient. Namely, when regulated companies are not quoted as 
explained in Section 2, according to (Frontier Economics, 2005) direct estimation of 
the equity Beta is not possible. Therefore, its calculation requires further methodo-
logical basis, which is not suffi ciently elaborated in the tariff systems.
The authors in their estimates chose to calculate the coeffi cient Beta based on the 
Betas of a set of comparable quoted companies at the ZSE, bearing in mind at the 
same time that such estimates could lead to much higher Betas than those used by 














59A Comprehensive Approach to Regulation of Natural Monopolies – Setting a Fair Rate of Return
Namely, NRAs in the EU, especially those from the ex-communist regime, set Betas 
by comparing values of other regulatory regimes or in a reverse procedure, mean-
ing setting acceptable level of WACC (infl uenced by political or private interests) 
prior to defi ning Beta. The authors wanted to avoid such approaches and chose the 
approach which leans strictly to the Croatian stock market, neglecting at the same 
time the drawbacks of this approach. The estimates are done purely for academic 
purpose. In a real regulatory process, a value for WACC and Beta is a compromise 
which should result from reasoned negotiations.  
In the chosen approach it is necessary to defi ne:
a) the choice of the set of comparators and
b) the choice of estimation method.
Regarding the choice of comparators the authors chose to carry out comparison 
with two energy companies (INA and JANAF) quoted at the ZSE as mentioned in 
the Section 2. Such approach was chosen in order to refl ect the Croatian situation 
as undoubtedly as possible, not allowing the infl uence of other countries situation, 
neither through the Betas they used in regulatory methodology nor through the Betas 
of companies listed at other stock exchanges.  
Regarding the second choice, the choice of estimation method, two estimates were 
used – daily and weekly movement of stocks compared to the ZSE index CROBEX. 
Both time estimates were used due to the underdeveloped national fi nancial market 
and its low liquidity on one hand. On the other hand such estimates according to 
author’s opinion can increase the quality of results obtained for two quoted compa-
nies.
Firstly, the equity Beta (or so called levered Beta) of comparing companies was 
calculated. The equity Beta of comparable companies is the covariance of the stock-
return with the market-return. It is calculated (or reported) Beta for stock. The esti-
mation method is based on whether days or weeks:
 
(4)
The next step envisages calculation of asset Betas (or so called unlevered Beta) 




where E is a market value for equity and D is a debt of comparing companies ( INA 
and JANAF). Asset Betas of comparable companies obtained in this way is the best 
estimate of asset Betas of analyzed companies in Croatia (HEP, Plinacro, GPZ) car-














+ −1 1( )*
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Finally, the equity Betas (relevered Beta) for all four monopoly companies is 
calculated, applying capital structure (share of equity and debt from respective book 
values) of each individual company:
 
(6)
The values for Betas obtained following the above mentioned steps are given in 
Section 5. 
Formula (2) envisages calculation of a post-tax WACC as defi ned in the respec-
tive tariff systems. However, in other Central and Eastern European countries as 
demonstrated in (Karotamm, 2010) the pre-tax WACC is calculated. Afterwards this 
pre-tax value is used for estimating a return on regulated assets and fi nally allowed 
revenue. A standard formula for a pre-tax WACC is: 
 
(7)
where g is gearing and t is corporate tax rate (T/100).
In this case the cost of equity is multiplied by a tax “wedge”. A tax wedge in 
Croatia is 25%.
Also some regulators due to tax issues prefer to use “vanilla” WACC:
 
(8)
The assessment of corporation tax liabilities for regulated company, in the “va-
nilla” WACC, is managed as a cash-fl ow item and added to the operation costs of a 
business (Oxera, 2005). 
According to (Oxera, 2005) interest payable on debt is already factored into tax-
able profi t therefore post-tax WACC should not be used in the determination of the 
prices which is in contrast to a wording of Croatian methodologies.  
According to authors’ opinion, it seems that a formula for the post-tax WACC, 
as it is defi ned in the tariff systems, is incorrect and the values obtained for WACC 
in this way are too low. Namely, when a value for WACC is applied in further cal-
culations for the allowed revenue, these calculations are made for the parameters 
which precede taxation. If a value for post-tax WACC is calculated rather than for 
pre-tax WACC, according to (Independent pricing and regulatory tribunal, 2002) a 
tax should be e.g. included in expenditure cash fl ow rather than in WACC. However, 
the Croatian regulatory principle and methodology does not envisage inclusion of 
the tax in the expenditure cash fl ow or any similar solution. Due to the improper and 
incomplete methodology for setting WACC and inclusion of tax in estimates, the 
allowed regulated revenue is set at the lower value than it is justifi ed, if calculations 
follow tariff systems’ principles.
β βrelvered unlevered T D
E
= ⋅ + − ⋅( ( ) )1 1
WACC g r
t





WACC g r r gvanilla d e= ⋅ + −⋅ ( )1
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Calculation and Results
In this Section calculations of the WACC for four activities and respective four com-
panies are presented:
1 electricity transmission (HEP-OPS),
2 electricity distribution (HEP-ODS),
3 gas transmission (Plinacro) and
4 gas distribution (GPZ). 
Calculations are based on the analysis of energy sector, its legal and regulatory 
framework, as well as on the methodology described in previous Section. For the 
calculation of the cost of equity (2) using CAPM approach three parameters are im-
portant the risk free rate, the market risk premium and the coeffi cient Beta.
For the risk free rate the long-term securities of the Republic of Croatia were 
analyzed since they are considered as the most secure investment for which the state 
guarantee. The analysis is based on the 10-year bonds, including bonds issued in 
Euros and kunas by the Ministry of fi nance and the bonds issued in Euros and US 
dollars by the Republic of Croatia. All 10-year bonds whose maturity has not been 
reached are shown in Table 2. According to (Ministry of Finance and Government of 
Republic of Croatia, 2010) a basis for carrying out the risk free rate analysis in this 
way is a characteristic of regulatory policies in other countries as well. 
Table 2: 10-year bonds issued by the Ministry of fi nance and the Republic of 
Croatia
Issuers Currency Coupon Maturity 
 RHMF 12   EUR  6.875% 23.05.2012  
 RHMF 14   EUR  5.500% 14.06.2014  
 RHMF 15   EUR  4.250% 14.07.2015  
 RHMF 20  EUR 6.500% 05.03.2020.
 RHMF 15  HRK 5.250% 15.12.2015.
 RHMF 17  HRK 4.750% 08.02.2017.
 RHMF 20  HRK 6.750% 05.03.2020.
 CROATIA 2011   EUR  6.750% 14.03.2011  
 CROATIA 2014   EUR  5.000% 15.04.2014  
 CROATIA 2019  USD 6.750% 05.11.2019.
 CROATIA 2020  USD 6.625% 14.07.2020.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Government of Republic of Croatia, 2010
The result of analysis shows that the yield of 10-year un-matured bonds is 6.5%. 
This result could be compared with some other recent research and analysis. Ac-
cording to (RBA) the yield on 10-year Croatian bonds is about 6.5%. Therefore, in 
62 Ivo Družić, Ivona Štritof, Tomislav Gelo
further calculations this value was taken as the risk free rate. In the same source the 
yield analysis of 10-year bonds in other countries is given. A current yield in Germa-
ny is 3% (maturity on July, 4th of 2020) and in the USA 3.5% (maturity on May, 15th 
2020). The yield of the Croatian bonds used as the risk free rate could be compared 
with the yields of bonds issued in local currencies by some other CEE countries (new 
EU members) whose economy in similar situation as in Croatia, e.g. Czech Republic 
3.75%, Hungary 7.5% and Poland 5.25% (RBA, 2010a). 
The second CAPM parameter, the market risk premium, was estimated using a 
credit rating of Croatia determined by Moody’s as Baa3. According to the analysis 
and research carried out in (Demodoran, 2010) the market risk premium which cor-
responds to the respective credit rating equals 3%. Fig. 3 shows a relationship be-
tween a country long term credit rating and risk premium.
The value of 3% could be additionally challenged if the yields of 10-year bonds 
issued by Croatia and the USA are compared. Namely, as previously mentioned, the 
Croatian bonds yield is 6.5% while for the USA bonds yield is 3.5%. A difference in 
yields represents a country risk premium for Croatia above the USA’s risk. 
Fig. 3:  A relationship between the country long term credit rating and the risk pre-
mium 
Source: Demodoran, 2010
Countries with no risk premium are Australia, Canada and most of the EU-15 
countries, while countries with high risk premium are Ecuador, Moldova and Ja-
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maica. Countries whose risk premium is close to Croatia’s are e.g. Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Columbia, Latvia, Romania etc.
The third parameter in the calculation of the cost of equity is the coeffi cient Beta, 
namely equity Beta. This parameter presented the biggest challenge in authors’ anal-
ysis and calculations due to, primarily, the lack of energy companies listed at ZSE 
and the lack of historic regulatory research and practice. As mentioned in Section 4 
a comparison with two energy companies (INA and JANAF) quoted at the ZSE was 
carried out using two estimates, daily and weekly movement of stocks compared 
to the ZSE index CROBEX. A share of INA stocks in total stock market was 2% 
in 2007 and 2009 while in 2008 was 6%, whereas a share of JANAF stocks in total 
stock market was between 0.1% in 2008 and 0.6% in 2009.
For calculation of the levered Beta for INA a period in between December 1st 
2006 and February 1st 2010 was used (769 days and 166 weeks), while for JANAF a 
period in between June 28th 2005 and January 2nd 2010 was used (958 days and 232 
weeks). Fig. 4 shows a movement of daily index for JANAF and the Crobex based 
on (ZSE, 2010). The fi rst day is presented with 100. 
Fig. 4: Movement of JANAF’s daily index and Crobex (1st day =100)
Source: ZSE, 2010
During the fi rst listed year a movement of JANAF’s stock followed the Crobex, 
after that there was a signifi cant discrepancy in trends lasting for about six month 
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Fig. 5 shows the movement of INA’s daily index and Crobex (ZSE). The analysis 
shows greater deviations between INA’s daily index and Crobex compared to the 
movement of JANAF’s stock in comparison to Crobex. Trends shown in Fig. 4 and 
Fig. 5 are additionally supported by calculating a levered Beta on daily and weekly 
bases based on (INA, 2008; JANAF, 2008) for both stocks (Table 3).
Results for INA and JANAF (natural monopoly for oil transport) shown in Table 
3 are actually in contradiction to theory which assumes that natural monopolies’ 
stocks  are more stable and fl uctuate less than stocks of companies which are not 
natural monopolies. However, the results could be explained by the fact that INA 
has actually a monopoly in gas business (a wholesale of gas) and thus infl uences 
signifi cantly the whole gas business in Croatia. On the other side, it should be also 
beard in mind that INA is commodity oriented (both gas and oil), rather than net-
works oriented, which has an impact on the result for Beta. Additionally, a result for 
mostly state-owned company JANAF is a consequence of insuffi ciently developed 
national fi nancial market. In order to alleviate results from Table 3 all values for both 
companies are taken into further calculations.
Fig. 5: Movement of INA’s daily index for INA and Crobex (1 day =100)
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Table 3: Betas for INA and JANAF
Company
Levered Beta Unlevered Beta
Beta - days Beta - weeks Beta - daily Beta - weekly
INA 0.644 0.832 0.477 0.616
JANAF 0.899 1.137 0.870 1.101
Source: Authors calculation based on ZSE, 2010
The unlevered Beta is corrected for the debt-equity ratios (Formula 6) for both 
companies.  
Applying formula (6) a fi nal result for the relevered Beta for companies in all four 
monopoly activities is shown on Fig. 6.  The values are shown for the median and 
average relevered Beta obtained from daily and weekly values of the unlevered Be-
tas for INA and JANAF. In further calculations the median Betas are used, although 
there are no signifi cant differences between the average and median Betas. 
Fig. 6 also shows estimates for average and median levered Betas applied in some 
EU regulatory regimes (Energy Regulatory Offi ce, 2009). A signifi cant difference 
between data for Croatia and other regulators results from the fact that authors in 
their calculations used data from a single national fi nancial market and companies 
listed on a single domestic market, while the practice of other regulators is very often 
to make a comparison with companies worldwide, or to apply the estimates of Betas 
(average or median) from a number other regulatory regimes.  
Fig. 6: Average and median Beta for four activities - Croatia vs EU countries 
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According to tariff systems a parameter cost of debt is defi ned as a ratio between 
the interest costs for short and long term loans and bonds (data from the profi t and 
lost statements) and total liabilities resulting from respective loans and bonds (data 
from the balance sheets). The methodology (Section 4) does not require calculation 
of the weighted average interest cost, which would be a complex and requiring ex-
ercise in case when data is not available in publically published companies’ reports. 
Data used in calculation of the cost of debt for HEP’s companies (HEP, 2008) and 
Plinacro (Plinacro, 2008) are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4:  Data used in calculation of the cost of debt for HEP’s companies and 
Plinacro
Liabilities Amount (000 kunas)
HEP Plinacro
Bonds 1.197.070 0
Long term credits 2.963.030 659.158
Short term credits 1.118.344 0
Total liabilities 5.278.444 659.158
Financial expenses (interest rates) 286.797 31.564
Average cost of debt 5.42% 4.78%
Source: HEP, 2008; Plinacro, 2008
In case of GPZ the cost of debt equals zero, as explained in Section 2. 
A parameter in calculation of the WACC which signifi cantly infl uences results is 
a share of debt and equity in respective monopoly activities. Data for these two pa-
rameters was taken from the company’s 2008 annual reports. However, the optimal 
ratio of debt and equity for HEP-OPS and HEP-ODS was estimated due to the fact 
that a fully-fl edged unbundling within HEP Group has not been carried out yet which 
infl uences transparency and accuracy of the book values. More thorough discussion 
on this issue could be found in (Štritof et al., 2009) Therefore, in case of HEP’s com-
panies two estimates were done:
a)  Version 1 – the ratio of debt and equity on the HEP Group level (data form fi nan-
cial statements) and
b)  Version 2 – the estimated ratio. 
A ratio in Version 2 is a result of authors’ research which encompassed the analy-
sis of the best regulatory practice in setting ratios, analysis of passed and planned 
investments of HEP-OPS and HEP ODS, taking into account especially a fact that 
a signifi cant portion of HEP- ODS funds for investments come from the collected 
connection fees (a deep connection fee approach is applied). In addition for both 
activities it is to be expected that in future a grater share of new loans will be taken, 
infl uencing a share of debt in WACC calculations. Primarily, due to the fact that in 
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last couple of years investments in HEP’s networks declined signifi cantly (CERA, 
2010) although the age of network assets urge for new investments. 
However, as long as a complete unbundling of assets and liabilities is not carried 
out within HEP Group, recognising them in respective balance sheets of daughter 
companies (HEP-OPS and HEP-ODS), it will not be possible to defi ne exactly a 
gearing rather the estimates will be used as done in this paper.  
The share of debt and equity in respective monopoly activities based on (HEP, 
2008; Plinacro, 2008; GPZ, 2008) is shown in Fig. 7. 
Fig. 7: The share of debt and equity in respective monopoly activities
Source: HEP, 2008; Plinacro, 2008; GPZ, 2008
A parameter which is also taken into account in formula (2) is a tax on profi t. In 
Croatia it equals 20% (Croatian Parliament, 2010). 
Fig. 8 shows the results for post and pre tax WACC for the respective monopoly 
activities. A range goes from the most risky activity, gas distribution, to the least 
risky activity, electricity transmission. It is important to emphasise that these val-
ues could not be compared with the values really applied in the Croatian case as 
previously said. The main reason for this is the fact that the Government sets tariffs 
for monopoly activates. These tariffs are often not the ones resulting from meth-
odologies, proposed by the energy undertaking and considered by the CERA, but 
are rather a result of political decision. After the Government makes a decision on 
tariffs, recalculation of regulatory parameters, including a rate-of-return is not done. 
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Fig. 8:  Results for nominal pre-tax and post-tax WACC for four monopoly activi-
ties
Source: Authors calculation
The authors’ results imply that different WACC values are primarily determined 
by a ratio between equity and debt of respective companies. WACC for GPZ is the 
highest due to the fact that GPZ does not have any debts toward credit institutions. 
Nevertheless, from the stand point of business riskiness gas distribution business is 
more risky than gas transmission or electricity transmission so it is logical to have 
higher WACC. There are several reasons for such statement. Namely, in Croatia 
operates 37 gas distributors and only one gas transporter. Distribution is riskier since 
planning the consumption of each distributer is more uncertain than planning the 
consumption of total national consumption as it is done in a case of transmission. 
Namely, gas distributors compete with other sources of energy (wood, electricity, oil, 
coal). On the other hand gas transmission is purely monopoly activity with limited 
market risk. Consequently, an utilisation of assets is unpredictable as well. In addi-
tion, in 2008 most gas distributors were also gas suppliers and about 80% of their 
total gas price was a transfer cost (a wholesale price). 
Electricity and transmission in Version 2 have the lowest WACC values due to the 
greatest assumed share of debt. 
The importance of obtained results lies in the fact the estimates of WACC for 
analyzed natural monopolies are carried out for the fi rst time in such way and that 
they can serve as a basis for further expert analysis in regulatory processes. These 
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of return, which would enable indispensable new investments in electricity and gas 
networks 
A validity of the obtained results could be challenged by comparing them with 
values of nominal pre-tax WACC in some other European countries with similar fi -
nancial and economic development (Fig. 9). A range between the most and the least 
risky activities follows the same pattern as in authors’ results (when Version 2 is tak-
en into account for electricity distribution and transmission). Regarding the WACC 
values for respective activities the amounts are quite similar. The only signifi cant 
difference is in a case of gas distribution. However, here it is important to emphasise 
that in the estimates data for GPZ were taken. GPZ as stated earlier does not have 
any dept component (contrary to some other gas distributers in Croatia) which has 
a refl ection on WACC whose level is above average level in ERRA countries (gas 
distribution companies have a gearing above zero).     
Fig. 9: Pre-tax WACC in ERRA countries
Source: ERRA, 2009
Discussion and conclusion
A key part of the paper is calculation of WACC for four monopoly activities based on 
the provisions of the energy laws and the by-laws in a form of tariff systems that are 
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sis carried out in the paper lies in a fact that an up-to-date regulatory practice does 
not envisage a transparent and consistent procedure for setting the WACC, neither 
in a form of a well-grounded methodology for estimating WACC nor in a form of a 
publically available data published by the CERA or energy undertakings. Although 
such regulatory practice does not leave much space for an expert analysis and an 
academic challenge of the applied WACC per se, it, however, leaves much space for 
an academic challenge of a regulatory policy and methodology as a whole. 
From a regulatory policy point of view, network tariffs are still administratively 
set without a precedent thorough and deep analysis founded on economic and tech-
nical grounds. Looking from a long term perspective such situation is fi nancially 
unsustainable and unsecure for indispensable investments in such capital intensive 
activities, primarily in electricity transmission and distribution as well as in gas dis-
tribution. Foreign investments which are essential in energy sector, especially in 
defi ciency of domestic investment, are negligible. This is in particular evident in the 
gas distribution. Although some of the gas distributors have been privatized, there is 
still a lack of investments due to an uncertainty in price and regulatory policies. 
From a methodological point of view, the regulatory methodology set in the tariff 
systems needs further developments and improvements. If leaving other elements 
of a methodology aside (e.g. operating expenditures, regulated asset base etc.) and 
focusing solely on a method for calculating WACC and its particular parameters, 
there is a need for increasing understanding of WACC characteristics and meaning 
in regulatory methodology. The tariff systems defi ned WACC as a nominal post-tax 
WACC. Consequently, if the tariff systems’ methodology is strictly followed, the 
results obtained for post-tax WACC (a range in between 6.01% and 8.24% and) are 
lower in comparison to a pre-tax WACC (a range in between 7.52% and 10.30%), as 
it is a case in other comparable central and eastern European countries. 
However, in those countries the analysis of WACC calculations shows that in 
many of these cases calculations are based on proxy parameters overtaken from de-
veloped countries (EU-15). Primarily this refers to Beta which is considered as an 
exogenous variable. In other words it is not calculated based on a situation in a re-
spective national or regional fi nancial market.
In order to avoid setting a level of allowed revenue below a reasonable level, it 
is necessary to supplement a regulatory method with an additional tax component 
(e.g. include a tax in a cash fl ow). The other option would be to change a defi nition 
of WACC in a pre-tax WACC. Such changes in the methodology are a necessary 
precondition for setting a fair rate-of-return.   
Finally, a calculation of WACC and estimation of its parameters is quite doubtful 
and challenging if there is no precedent regulatory practices whose result would be 
a reasoned and founded defi nition of each parameter and a method or a source used 
for its estimate. In case of authors’ calculations based on their own assumptions an 
obvious evidence for such statement is e.g. the values obtained for a coeffi cient Beta. 
71A Comprehensive Approach to Regulation of Natural Monopolies – Setting a Fair Rate of Return
If these values are compared to average Beta values used in a representative sample 
of other countries, a huge discrepancy can be noticed. 
Therefore, one can say that without the respective defi nitions, as precise as pos-
sible, a regulatory process lacks transparency and credibility. Moreover, it increases 
a distrust and incomprehension of parties involved.
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